The cycle of performance measurement and management begins with explicitly establishing goals which are reflected in the adoption of specific performance indicators, followed by analysis and actions aimed at producing change to improve performance in a variety of dimensions such as equity, access, effectiveness, efficiency and social responsiveness. The application of performance indicators may involve simply reporting data to actors for accountability purposes, or it may involve, in addition, taking action to stimulate change. This paper will first summarize some evidence on the use and impacts of public release of health care performance data, based largely on the American experience (as described in "Dying to know: Public Release of Information about Quality of Health Care" by Marshall et al., co-published by The Nuffield Trust and Rand, 2000). Some of the main conclusions from this review of evidence from the United States are that: first, currently available report cards are rarely read by individual consumers, and do not seem to have much influence on their decisions to choose health care providers; but second, and although physicians and provider organisations tend to be critical of performance reports, provider organisations seem to be the most responsive to publicly disclosed data.
Defining performance
Understanding the role performance indicators may play in improving the delivery and outcomes of health care requires an understanding of the scope and magnitude of performance issues in health systems. Additionally, the judicious use of performance indicators to predictably effect desired changes requires an understanding of the evidence on the effectiveness of, and the challenges in implementing, specific transformation strategies or levers for change.
Three countries -Australia, United Kingdom and the United States -will be used to illustrate the nature of these issues and challenges. These countries offer interesting comparisons as they range from the nationalized monolithic NHS, to the pluralistic private sector oriented system of the United States, with Australia having characteristics of both (McLoughlin et al., 2001 ).
Though performance is described and evaluated in many ways, a consensus on the principal domains is emerging and evident in the work of international organisations like WHO and OECD, as well as the performance frameworks being implemented by individual countries. The domains of effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and equity are commonly included in describing key dimensions of health care performance. Discrete dimensions are sometimes subsumed in broad definitions of quality such as the one developed by the Institute of Medicine in the US, which defines quality as "the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increases the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge" (Institute of Medicine, 1990) . To fully actualize this definition of quality, principles of equity and efficiency are inherent to population health, effectiveness is requisite for achieving outcomes, and responsiveness is an essential property at the individual level. It is performance in this broad definition of quality that will provide the context for examining applications of performance indicators in this paper. © OECD 2002 2. Improving health system performance: a clear priority Performance assessments may vary dramatically according to the methods and definitions used. Though legitimate debate exists regarding measurement techniques, there is little disagreement regarding the need to improve performance in health systems globally.
Despite the evidence of significant gains in some health status indicators, the peer-reviewed literature describes dramatic quality-of-care deficiencies including inappropriate care, safety problems and unjustified regional variation in practice patterns. Numerous surveys at both an individual country level, as well as cross-country comparisons, portray the formidable scale and scope of performance issues. Whether through the eyes of physicians, patients or purchasers/payers, concerns regarding eroding performance are rife. In a recent physician survey conducted in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, physicians reported a significant decline in quality in all five countries (Blendon et al., 2001) . When asked how their ability to provide quality care had changed over the past five years, significant numbers of physicians reported that it was worse; Australia 38 per cent, Canada 59 per cent, New Zealand 53 per cent, the United Kingdom 46 per cent and in the United States 57 per cent. Only one-quarter or less of the physicians in any country reported that their ability to provide high quality care had improved over the past five years. In a survey looking at attitudes of nurses across five countries -Canada, Germany, Scotland, England, the United States -17 to 44 per cent reported that quality had deteriorated in the past year (Aiken et al., 2001) .
Lest these findings be discounted as simply the complaints of demoralized clinicians, we can look at public perceptions on the performance of health systems. In a survey conducted in 1998 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and New Zealand), the public indicated overwhelmingly that the health systems in their country required fundamental change or a complete overhaul (Blendon et al., 2001) . And, even more telling regarding public attitudes was data from a 1998 American Consumer Satisfaction Index (Lieber et al., 1998) which placed hospitals between the US Postal Office and the Internal Revenue Service. This sobering assessment clearly indicates a mistrust of the American public in health care institutions, and provides one more dramatic data point to illustrate the pressing need to address performance issues.
The case is clear for placing a high priority on improving systemic performance and fostering accountability through public reporting of performance data. The cycle of performance measurement and management begins with explicitly establishing goals, which are reflected in the adoption of specific performance indicators, followed by analysis and reporting of data to various audiences through public and confidential means (Hurst and Jee-Hughes, 2001 ). Then, systematic implementation of actions must be aimed at producing change in multiple dimensions such as equity, access, effectiveness, efficiency and social responsiveness. A careful diagnosis of the underlying causes of problems in the health care system is needed to select the appropriate intervention.
The possible methods and approaches for performance improvement are numerous but the evidence basis is often scant or equivocal for selection. Furthermore, the levers for change will vary among countries (or even within different health care systems in the same country) depending upon factors such as underlying values, financing and organisational arrangements, professional culture, and the selfperception of the citizenry as active or passive participants in health care interactions. The selection of the intervention will depend upon who and what is the intended target for behavioral change; for example, providers (individual or institutional), professional bodies, citizens, or managers. Though, identifying a "best method" to effect change may not be realistic, this paper will identify the range of possible approaches, discuss their strengths and limitations, and describe relevant country experiences.
Public reporting of performance indicators
Despite a growing movement of quality measurement and intervention efforts in many countries, there is minimal evidence that predictable and widespread improvements in quality are occurring. This fact, coupled by a political trend towards greater transparency in government and public services, has © OECD 2002 resulted in a movement calling for accountability in health care. Public reporting of performance data is one of the principal instruments used to realize this accountability.
Three models of accountability in health care have been described and apply to OECD countries in various combinations (Table 1 ). All rely on performance indicators, either explicit or implicit, to some degree.
The three models are economic, public and professional (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1996) . The model of professional accountability, dominant in most health systems historically, views the physician-patient dyad as the operative focus of accountability with certification, accreditation, licensure and litigation as instruments for enforcement. Increasingly the professional model of accountability is regarded as insufficient, perhaps even imprudent, and thus this model is accompanied by one of the other two. The economic model, for which the United States is the clearest example, is predicated on the notion that choice and exit can be mechanisms of enforcing accountability in a marketplace. And thirdly, the public model views the citizen as receiving a public good with the role of the government to compel accountability though the instruments of "voice" and policy. In all of these models, objective measures of performance are increasingly relied upon, accompanied by a trend towards public reporting despite minimal evidence of its effectiveness for driving constructive behavioral or system change.
The four principle reasons for public disclosure can be summarized as the following; regulation including public accountability, purchasing or commissioning decisions, facilitation of consumer selection and choice, and provider behavior change (Marshall et al., 2000a) . The United States is regarded as a country with some of the longest experience (over a decade) in public reporting of health systems performance data, producing a body of evidence to evaluate the role public reporting may play to improve health care systems. A review article, published in JAMA (Marshall et al., 2000b) in 1999 provides useful information (summarized below) regarding the evidence of effectiveness of performance data for these purposes and for the critical audiences including the public, providers, purchasers or payers and policymakers. Whilst the market context in the US may differ in allowing for more consumer choice, OECD countries face similar challenges in regulation, purchasing/ commissioning decisions and clinical practice, as well as a growing attention to individual responsiveness and patient center care.
The public
In summary, evidence from the US indicates that patients/consumers have used performance data only minimally, continuing to largely rely on word-of-mouth for information to make health care decisions (Bates and Gawande, 2000; Coulter and Cleary, 2001 ). There are numerous reasons why this may be occurring. Most of the performance data that is publicly disclosed was intended for other purposes and audiences and so is neither easily comprehended nor readily applied for decision making. For example, it simply may not be realistic to expect that the average person is going to take an interest in performance data about health care subjects that they think are not going to occur in their lives, such as CABG (coronary artery bypass graft) mortality rates, one of the most highly publicized Adapted from Emanuel and Emanuel (1996) . performance measures in the United States. As a result performance information goes unused and poor quality goes unpunished, or even unnoticed by a large part of the public (Dowd and Finch, 2001 ).
Furthermore, despite erosion of public confidence regarding the health system at large, individuals in the United States still believe their doctor is good and so have little motivation to sort through voluminous performance data to decipher the meaning. It is only fairly recently that consumers (at least in the United States) have begun to realize that there are significant quality problems that represent potential hazard to them. Designing performance data specifically with consumers in mind, that is understanding the salient data needs and formatting issues, may dramatically influence the uptake of data by consumers. The use of comprehensible performance indicators may be the most pragmatic format for delivering information.
Providers
A second key audience is providers, both institutional providers (hospitals, NHS trusts, health plans) and individual providers (physicians and other clinicians). Experience in the US has involved governmental initiatives, at both federal level (Medicare) and state level authorities, as well as voluntary initiatives through collaborative peer efforts at regional levels. Summaries of the literature indicate that institutions do, in fact, pay attention to, and use performance data in three ways; to improve appropriateness of care processes, to identify poor performers, and to alter processes or structures to be responsive to patient stated preferences or complaints (Marshall et al., 2000a and 2000b; Legnini et al., 2000) . Whether the actual public release, as opposed to the use of data in confidential peer review, is the principal driving factor is debatable. Case studies have noted improvements in care in circumstances where public reporting occurred as well as when peer review was conducted in more confidential settings. (addressed in Section 4).
Over the past twenty years, considerable experience with the use of data in peer review and public reporting has been published. One of the most successful, and highly studied initiatives was in New York State where the State Health Department published post-CABG (coronary artery bypass graft) mortality rates. The rate of decline in mortality in New York was twice the average national rate of decline in the first five years of the program and New York had the lowest risk-adjusted mortality of any state in the US by the fourth year of the program (O'Connor and Eagle, 1998). In the first three years alone the risk adjusted mortality rate fell 41 per cent (Chassin, 2001) . These changes have all been attributed to the actions taken by the hospitals and clinical staff, including changes in leadership, curtailment of operating privileges and intensive peer review. Market forces, including selection by consumers and payers, were not viewed as contributors to the significant change though it is important to acknowledge that in the early year's media attention was fierce and drew attention to outliers (Chassin, 1997 and . Impressive as these successes are, it is important to note that the program has not proved to be generalizable either by replication in New York with other clinical conditions, or emulated by other states.
There are other successful applications of performance indicators to changing health systems performance in the US For example, following the introduction of health plan reporting requirements for various process measures in selected conditions including post myocardial infarction, the rates of betablocker prescribing rose from 62 per cent in 1996 to 85 per cent in 1999 (Ayanian and Quinn, 2001) . Evidence from the US does provide a basis for using performance indicators to drive provider and system change. To date, the evidence would best support using published performance data to effect institutional provider behavior, and to accompany data disclosure with additional levers for change.
Purchasers/Payers
A third audience for performance indicators is purchasers or payers. Since employers are the dominant buyers of health care in the US, they theoretically have both the motive and clout to buy health services or insurance coverage based on performance. To date, despite considerable attention to the competitive marketplace as a driver of discipline to improve performance, the reality lags beyond the rhetoric. There are notable initiatives of large employers and business coalitions who purportedly make © OECD 2002 value-based decisions in buying health care; that is, balancing cost with benefit effectiveness. However, the common practice in purchasing or commissioning services is that price trumps all other performance data. Two large studies (Gabel et al., 1998; Hibbard and Jewett, 1997) collectively looked at over 1500 employers across the US The authors concluded that the use of performance data by employers was limited, explained in part because the data was not adequately packaged to be comprehensible and useful to these buyers. Reliance on purchasers and payers to improve performance through use of indicators as a basis for selection has not proven to be a reliable strategy.
Policy makers
Finally, a fourth key audience is policy makers at national and local levels who are responsible for regulation of the health services sector. Policy can be dramatically influenced by performance indicators as was demonstrated in the following examples from the US and UK as reported by Anderson and Hussey in Health Affairs (2001) . The decision of Prime Minister Tony Blair to invest significant new resources into the NHS, was influenced by data showing Britain to be spending at a lower percentage of GDP than most northern European countries. Another example is the United States, which was influenced by international performance data to train more general practitioners when the data showed that the US trains a higher proportion of specialists than most European countries (Anderson and Hussey, 2001 ).
New initiatives using explicit performance indicators are emerging in the form of national reports, issued by government, on the performance of health systems in several countries. The United Kingdom, in 1999 adopted a Performance Assessment Framework (NHS Executive, 1999), for publicly reporting NHS performance. The US Congress has mandated that a federal agency (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality) develop a National Quality Report, comprised of multiple performance domainsincluding safety, responsiveness, and effectiveness (Institute of Medicine, 2001 ). The prototype of this report is to be released in 2003. And, in Australia, similar efforts have been underway since 1994 with the National Health Ministers' Benchmark Group, which produced three national reports in (National Health Ministers' Benchmarking Working Group, 1996 .
Applications of performance indicators
In trying to identify reliable means for ameliorating performance, a natural reflex is to assume that more money and resources are the first solution to be considered. The case of the United States may be most dramatic to refute this assumption. The United States, where 1.1 trillion dollars is annually spent (13.1 per cent of GDP) (see National Health Expenditure Projections, 2001), ranked 37th on the WHO country assessments (World Health Organization, 2000) , largely based on the low ratings in the equity domain. Even more striking, is the fact that despite the US consistently having the highest health spending per capita and as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2000) , the relative performance of the US on OECD indicators has not improved from 1960-1998 and has actually had the greatest relative decline in life expectancy at birth for females and infant mortality (Anderson and Hussey, 2001 ).
Though indisputable that the performance of health systems is linked to resourcing decisions at the macro and micro levels, this paper will focus on other applications of performance indicators for changing systems and human behaviors. Possible approaches can be grouped within five categories, as depicted in Table 2 . This paper will briefly discuss each category and select applications, of emerging interest and reliance, to discuss in more depth.
External oversights i) External review and inspection
External review, oversight and inspection are fundamental to performance monitoring and accountability. Accreditation, licensing and/or certification are the instruments used to assure, at least, minimum standards of compliance and competencies. All OECD countries have systems in place to accomplish these functions through a blend of government and professional mechanisms (Hurst and © OECD 2002 Jee-Hughes, 2001). Increasingly, countries are using explicit, rather than implicit, performance indicators and expanding the types of indicators from a traditional focus on structure, to incorporate process compliance and outcome indicators.
New investments for standard setting and oversight are evident in the UK and Australia. In each country, national bodies have been established to be responsible for an agenda of setting performance targets, monitoring performance through newly defined reporting procedures, and working to identify and implement effective change strategies. In the United Kingdom, three new bodies have been established .The first, the Commission for Health Improvement, is based on the model of the National Audit Commission, and is charged with regular review of all NHS agencies in a four year period, as well as being authorized by the Secretary of State for Health to have investigative powers in situations requiring an independent inquiry (McLoughlin et al., 2001) . Secondly, a new body, just established in 2001, called The National Clinical Assessment Authority will independently evaluate poorly performing doctors, when local efforts are inadequate. A third new national entity will have specific responsibilities for setting performance targets and monitoring performance in the areas of safety and error reduction (described later) (see Department of Health, 2001a) . Likewise, Australia has also invested in new infrastructure for performance monitoring and oversight. The National Health Performance Committee (NHPC), established in 1999, has responsibility for developing and maintaining a national performance framework for the whole of the health system, as well as to support benchmarking and provide comparative performance data in population health outcomes, risk factors and health system measures (National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian Health Care, 1999).
ii) Setting performance targets
Performance indicators can be used to make policy priorities explicit, thereby defining expectation, facilitating accountability, and focusing resources. This may be done at two levels; firstly, defining national priorities, and secondly, identifying specific performance targets within those priorities. Setting explicit performance targets has been in effect for nearly two decades in the NHS, largely focused on utilization and cost indicators (Hurst and Jee-Hughes, 2001 ). Both Australia and England have identified the need to focus on improving performance in specific priority disease areas and within specific population groups. Accordingly, Australia has had a system of identified national health priorities since 1996; namely asthma, depression, diabetes, cardiovascular and injury, with reports describing the best available data in most of the national priority areas (Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1998a , 1998b , 1999a , 1999b , 1999c ; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and Dept. of Health and Family Services, 1997).
One case study for examining the effectiveness of setting priorities and specific performance targets will be the newly defined initiatives in the UK and Australia to improve safety and reduce the incidence of adverse events and medical errors. Reducing the risk of harm is not only the right thing to 
Knowledge/Skill enhancement
Performance deficiency among clinicians poses a challenge for diagnosing the problem with enough accuracy to select and implement an effective corrective action. Fundamentally, it is critical to understand whether the deficient behavior is a problem of will, skill, a knowledge gap or a systems problem. Of course, it is likely to be a combination of these factors. Performance indicators can play a role in education and providing feedback to providers.
Knowledge deficiencies may be best understood as simply deriving from an inability to master new knowledge at the rate and complexity it is being produced. Even well intentioned and highly motivated clinicians have to grapple with the volume of evidence that is constantly becoming available. In the mid 1960s about 100 articles from randomized clinical trials were published. By the 1990s, approximately 10,000 articles from randomized clinical trials were annually published. In the past five years alone, nearly half (49 per cent) of all the extant medical literature has been published (Chassin, 1998) . This knowledge gap results in a knowledge lag meaning the time lapse between identification of more efficacious treatments and incorporation into routine practice. This time lag has been estimated to be in the range of 15-20 years, and even then the adoption of evidence into practice is very uneven . Furthermore this failure to translate research into practice is not only manifest in complicated clinical conditions or the use of emerging technologies and pharmaceuticals, but also in the most routinely treated medical problems like the common cold. For example, researchers in several different studies showed that physicians continue to prescribe antibiotics for the common cold in 40-60 per cent of office visits even though there is no evidence that antibiotics are effective for the cold virus (Mainous et al., 1996; Gonzales et al., 1997; Nyquist et al., 1998) .
The challenge for addressing this problem of knowledge deficiency, particularly when well understood as a continuous need for facilitating rapid uptake of published evidence into daily patient care, is complicated by a dearth of understanding as to powerful and predictable interventions. Clinical guideline use and peer reviews are two of the most common applications of performance indicators.
i) Clinical guidelines/protocols
Performance indicators, embedded in guidelines and protocols at a level understandable and actionable by clinicians, are widely used to improve clinical decision making. Performance measures may be more easily digested by physicians as they often are produced in a simple format defining critical process or outcome measures, thus facilitating the translation of evidence into practice.
There are significant challenges in the use of performance indicators to guide practice, and the acceptance of protocols and guidelines by physicians is likely to differ from country to country. In England, a recent British Medical Association survey of more than 100 doctors found that 70 per cent did not believe that the newly established national body (National Institute for Clinical Evidence) which is developing the evidence basis for guidelines and protocols is acting independently, Furthermore, 75 per cent said they disagreed with at least one of the newly developed decisions and 85 per cent said that they would ignore the Institute's guidance if they thought it was wrong (Reuters Health Headline, 18 May 2001).
The development of clinical guidelines and protocols is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Published research, to date, has not shown that the use of clinical guidelines and protocols alone have been effective in changing physician behavior (Greco and Eisenberg, 1993; Schuster et al., 1998; Cabana et al., 1999; Hayward, 1997; Lomas et al., 1989) . However, recent research is encouraging in the demonstration that practice guidelines incorporated into computer decision support systems shows potential. In two separate meta-analyses, totaling data from 39 studies, the use of computer generated prompts showed effectiveness in improving preventive services and drug prescribing .
ii) Peer review and feedback of performance data
This section will focus on use of performance indicators by peers for individual or comparative appraisal in a confidential setting. The experience in the US of one large multi-state consortium of physicians in New England is instructive and has been used to argue that the public disclosure of performance data is not necessary as a lever for change. In this consortium, comparative data was not publicly reported, but instead shared among physicians as peers for quality improvement education. Over two years, the risk-adjusted mortality rate for CABG was reduced 24 per cent from what would have been expected based on previous experience (O'Connor and Eagle, 1998).
More broadly, literature documents few systematic and sustained improvements using data by hospital or medical groups and though there are some notable exceptions, most have had rather modest improvements (Chassin, 1997) .What explains the relatively little activity by physicians to use data in a quest for performance improvement? A number of obstacles need to be addressed, most notably; lack of public demand for marked improvement, perverse payment incentives, inadequate education and training, and lack of effective information technology.
For physicians to be able to assume leadership positions for performance improvement, they will at minimum need data to be routinely available and credible. Better information regarding effective intervention strategies and improvement methods, and expert help in organisational change will also be required (Becher and Chassin, 2001 ).
Patient engagement/Empowering consumers
During the past five years, improving the patient's experience of health care has become a more visible priority in many OECD countries. There are two applications of performance indicators at the level of the individual citizen; the first is in the role of potential consumer of services, and secondly, as a patient.
Firstly, there are increasing efforts by governments to define the health care system as a public service with the citizen as a consumer having rights and responsibilities. In England, this has taken the form of articulating the modernization programs for the "new NHS" using language of "a health service designed around the patient". Newly committed resources and initiatives to promote citizen and patient empowerment include making information more readily available by 1-800-nurse lines, an electronic medical library providing access for the consumer to medical information shared with the clinical professionals (Coulter, 2001) , as well as publicly reporting high level performance indicators.
In the United States, patients rights legislation has been an area of high emotion and fiery rhetoric, but relatively little legislative success at the federal level. At the state level, various bills have been enacted to assure patients increased access to emergency care, clear appeals processes when turned down for treatment eligibility, protections of patients for continuity of care and protection of physicians from being "gagged" by health plans, meaning restricting physicians' ability to candidly discuss all treatment options with patients (even if insurers will not pay for the services). Legislative and regulatory inaction has fueled patient empowerment advocates to demand performance indicators allowing for more informed consumers who presumably will be able to decrease there risk exposure.
Patient empowerment is both theoretically and pragmatically sound. Programs to empower patients are not just politically correct, they can be effective at rationalizing resources. Evidence to support the importance of patient education is available. There is now a body of literature documenting the salutary effects of giving information to patients who have better outcomes, choose less risky procedures and avoid equivocal treatments (Coulter, 2001 ). This should increase our confidence that patients can not only make constructive use of performance data but also be reliable informants for performance assessment, such as in the NHS where systematic collection of data on patient perceptions will be part of the comprehensive performance framework (NHS Executive, 1999 
Incentives i) Financial
Pay for performance is a concept of increasing interest in both publicly financed and private pay health care systems. Payment policies can strongly influence how both institutional providers (hospitals, health systems) and individual providers (physicians and other health care professionals) deliver health services (Hillman, 1991) . The task is essentially one of designing and implementing funding mechanisms to reduce suboptimization in payment. There is some evidence to indicate that certain payment mechanisms are associated with particular practices. Capitation has been associated with providing fewer services and fee-for-service in encouraging the provision of more services, however the use of payment for objectively measured performance has relatively little research (Kindig, 1998) .
Paying for results, or rewarding high quality of care, is not a new concept. For example, it has been applied in various countries to promote preventive services such as immunization where there is universal agreement on the evidence basis. Though mortality from vaccine-preventable diseases is very low in most developed countries, WHO estimated that 20 000 avoidable deaths occurred in 1994 and rates of immunization in the United States remain so low that it is unlikely that the country will reach the target immunization rates set out in Healthy People 2010. For years, the NHS has been successful in paying GPs additionally for reaching target rates of immunizations. In Australia, incentives have included cash to parents and doctors and fast food vouchers to children. And in the U.S., managed care has experimented with various payment mechanisms to reward reduction of unnecessary procedures while reinforcing primary prevention (Anderson and Hussey, 2001 ).
The second major task for applying performance indicators to designing incentives is removing financial barriers to improving care. For example, if a performance target is identified for the reduction of unnecessary procedures, then payment methods must, at minimum, eliminate the financial barrier. To illustrate, in the case of reduction of unnecessary hysterectomies and C-sections, a loss of income for those hospitals most successful at achieving the target might occur. A fee-for-service payment method would reward the payer, as opposed to the hospital, which loses revenues.
The judicious use of financial incentives requires careful design in two ways; reinforcing positive performance through additional payments and removing payment mechanisms that perversely effect desired performance.
ii) Non-financial incentives
Though the word incentives is usually equated with money, there are other forms of incentives such as recognition, reductions in oversight, reputation enhancement, and increased professional satisfaction or institutional esteem.
A new incentive system being implemented in the UK is called "earned autonomy". It will reward high performing institutions with greater autonomy and direct access to financial resources, while the lower performers will be required to demonstrate intent to change and be subjected to more external vigilance. Explicit performance indicators and patient survey data will be used to judge performance (Secretary of State for Health, 2000).
Regulation
Countries worldwide are facing the same challenge of balancing the strengths and weaknesses of professional self-regulation with governmental regulation. Whilst recognizing that professionalism is possibly the best quality assurance that patients can have, there is a recognition that the degree of reliance heretofore exhibited is no longer regarded as sufficient or prudent. Both government and the professions have a shared responsibility to the public, and many countries are experimenting with the design of complementary roles and responsibilities.
Health systems are restructuring in ways that fundamentally change the nature and scope of professionalism. In the United States, the predisposition of the public to be wary of government interference is changing to an environment where the public looks to the government for protecting basic rights and enforcing accountability. This is being done through a concatenation of federal and state legislative and regulatory actions. Many of these actions are based on performance indicators including reporting requirements, accreditation and licensure. Even in the United Kingdom, where the NHS has long been a centralized system with regulation inherent to the management structure, significant regulation is being introduced for monitoring and inspection, as well as new systems and requirements for annual appraisal and revalidation (every five years) of physicians (based on explicit performance indicators).
One illustrative area (previously mentioned) where government regulation is being increased in England is in patient safety and reduction of adverse events. Building a Safer NHS, a Department of Health paper recently published estimates that 850 000 adverse events that effect one in ten hospitalized patients occur per year in the NHS and reported that there has been no real understanding or systematic approach to the identification and reduction of adverse events in England or in other countries worldwide (Department of Health, 2001b) . The United Kingdom, Australia and the United States are becoming exceptions to this observation as each country is addressing the concern at a national policy level as well as investing in new infrastructure and capacity to reduce the risk of error and occurrences of adverse events. These national initiatives require reporting of performance against explicit indicators. In England, a National Patient Safety Agency was announced in April of 2001 to facilitate learning from a new national reporting system which will collect and analyze data on medical error and adverse events.
The way forward
The use of performance indicators is a growing trend, and is supported by conventional management theory, a growing body of research, as well as policy imperatives. Table 3 shows the key strategies for change and their target audiences, being implemented in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. In every country multiple interventions are being used. Careful selection of strategies is called for given the costs inherent in implementation, and continuing uncertainly regarding conditions for most effective application. Recognizing these caveats, and the inherent limitations of any one approach, implies the need to carefully employ a blend of approaches with complementary effects.
Significant challenges exist in using performance indicators to create intentional change in health care systems. First, the state of the art is embryonic, meaning that there is an insufficient evidence base for understanding what works, under what circumstances, and with what consequences. Secondly, the costs, both direct and indirect, are daunting, particularly in developing the necessary information infrastructure which is deficient in many countries. Thirdly, the complexity of the health care sector, and the multiplicity of audiences and actors, means that there are likely to be both intended and unintended consequences of any approach. For example, the public reporting of performance data may have positive effects in terms of reducing the asymmetry of information between consumers and physicians and in compelling improved performance by institutions. However, it is also likely to require additional resources to implement and may result in tunnel vision, erosion of consumer trust and the Providers X X X X X Professional bodies X X X P u b l i c X X X X Payers and contractor purchasers X X X Policy makers X © OECD 2002 reluctance of providers (both individual and institutional) to provide health services to higher risk patient populations if outcome data may look worse (Leatherman and McCarthy, 1999) . The state of the art of performance measurement and reporting has made dramatic advances in the past decade but is still deficient to support widespread diffusion, predictable systematic application, and routinely fair and accurate assessments.
The investment of new resources into building capacity will be required, The potential of performance indicators to guide and compel improvement will not be fully realized until the state of the art is dramatically changed to make performance data more useful to target audiences. This will not only require better research and development but also investment in the areas of informatics and information infrastructure. Even in the US, where, arguably, relatively more has been spent on information capabilities, the health care industry lags behind other industries in IT investment. According to a US Department of Commerce report (1999) the health care industry ranked 38th out of 53 industries surveyed in informatics and information technology (US Department of Commerce, 1999) .
The design of a comprehensive strategy for intentional improvements in performance requires prudent choices of what levers for change should be implemented. Identification of the various key stakeholders and target audiences is necessary. Selection of intervention strategies should be guided by policy imperatives and research on effectiveness. Table 4 suggests a broad set of interventions, all based on some usage of performance indicators, which constitute a reasonable set of activities for any country to consider implementing. A multiple intervention strategy is necessary given the diverse set of actors and purposes, as well as the caveats requiring evidence of effectiveness for any single lever.
Actualizing the contribution of performance measurement and management to systematically improving health systems is both a matter of will and skill. There must be the will of countries to develop a coordinated and sustained strategy to achieve consensus on performance priorities and to implement improvement strategies. Secondly, there must be the skill to undertake capacity building in requisite competencies and infrastructure. 
